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Abstract
"The test of a first-class mind is the ability to hold two opposing viewsâ ¦ at the same time
and still retain the ability to function." (F. Scott Fitzgerald) In distributed complex
socio-technical systems, risks increasingly originate from multiple sources, affect multiple
agents with divergent perspectives and thus become systemic. The traditional simple causal
model of risk control and an individual decision-maker orientation is no longer adequate to
contain such risks. This paper reports a detailed case study of a highly complex architectural
project by Frank Gehry and his firm Gehry Partners, LLC. Gehry and his partners used the
3D representation software Catia tactfully in order to construct radical architectures with
dauntingly complex geometric surfaces in spite of increasing systemic risks. Our findings
suggest that, in order to successfully combat such risks, organizations rely upon organizing
mechanisms characteristic of high reliability organizations (HROs). Our analysis also
indicates that creating and maintaining a collective mindfulness is critical for risk
control/mitigation in complex socio-technical systems. IT artifacts such as Catia, in
combination with other social/technical actors such as skilled workers, contracts and
communication protocols, can enable the five cognitive processes underlying collective
mindfulness: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations (multiple
perspectives), sensitivity to operations (seeing the big picture of operation in the moment),
commitment to resilience (ability to bounce back from errors and cope with surprises via
improvisation), and underspecfication of structures (organized anarchy via fluid
decision-making).
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Systemic Risk, IT Artifacts, and High Reliability Organizations:
A Case of Constructing a Radical Architecture
Introduction
While information technology innovations become deeply enmeshed into our social
fabric, the issue of risk is gaining a new significance. The recent massive blackouts and
computer virus attacks are chilling reminders of the Three Mile Island event (Perrow, 1984). In
distributed complex socio-technical systems, risks are increasingly originated from multiple
sources, affect multiple agents with divergent perspectives and thus become systemic. IT risks
increasingly mix with other socio-technical risks, and are dynamically shaping and being shaped
by a network of relationships across time and space. Based upon research on high reliability
organizations (HROs), in order to successfully control/mitigate risk in complex systems,
organizations rely upon organizing mechanisms characteristic of HROs, one of which is
“collective mindfulness” (Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999).
However, such organizing mechanisms require both hierarchy and decentralization
simultaneously and are costly to achieve. We posit that IT artifacts, in combination with other
social/technical actors, enable HRO organizing mechanisms such as collective mindfulness.
Our argument emanates from a detailed examination of how risks are
controlled/mitigated in a highly complex architectural project by Frank Gehry and his firm
Gehry Partners, L.L.C.. Gehry and his partners used the 3D representation software Catia
tactfully in order to construct the complex geometric surfaces on the Peter B. Lewis Building at
Case Western Reserve University. Involving actors from a diverse set of organizations, an
architectural project embodies an accomplishment of a complex and distributed socio-technical
system. Numerous risks could be faced such as those concerning building constructability,
liabilities, and vendor management. It’s an even riskier endeavor, if the goal is to design and
construct a radically new type of building with dauntingly complex geometric surfaces with the
help of new technology. The insights we gained from such exercise provide a basis for theorizing
about systemic risks in complex socio-technical systems mediated by IT artifacts. This paper
contributes to understanding of IS software risk management since constructing a building is not
much different from developing a complex software system. In fact, architecture serves as a
better metaphor than economics for the information systems design (Boland, 1979, p.268).

Theoretical Framework
Prior Research on IT Risks
The current IS research on risk control strategies concentrates on software development
projects (Barki & Rivard, 1993; Barki, Rivard, & Talbot, 2001; Drummond, 1996; Heng, Tan, &
Wei, 2003; Keil, 1995; Keil & Robey, 1999; Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1996;
Ropponen & Lyytinen, 2000; Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001; Sumner, 2000) and most
of them look at risk from an individual decision maker’s point of view. Drawing upon various
theories, risk factors are identified and their consequences evaluated, and techniques and
heuristics are offered to mitigate them. During the process, a monolithic view of risk, usually that
of experts such as the project leaders (Barki et al., 2001) or IS auditors (Keil & Robey, 1999),
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gets elevated and reified. For instance, though recognizing that different actors may see different
aspects of a single risk, the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) approach relies upon group
leaders to prioritize risk and create risk control/mitigation strategies (Williams, Walker, &
Dorofee, 1997).
A review of literature also indicates the following: First, almost all IS research
emphasizes the adverse effects of risk, though it is well-known that risk-taking is one of the
competitive advantages of an organization (Singh, 1986). Second, most research has not gone
beyond identifying risk factors to look at risk and control strategies at a behavioral level in
socio-technical systems (Schmidt et al., 2001). Third, most IS research on risk focuses on the
project within a single organization while considering external stakeholders as environmental
factors (Alter & Ginzberg, 1978; Boehm, 1991; Drummond, 1996; McFarlan, 1981; Ropponen &
Lyytinen, 2000; Sumner, 2000). Though the stream of research on IT outsourcing takes
sometimes an industrial/ecological perspective, their main focus is on make-or-buy
decisions(Gopal, Sivaramakrishnan, Krishnan, & Mukhopadhyay, 2003; Jurison, 1995; Lacity &
Willcocks, 1998), and dyadic relationships between the organization and the software vendors.
However, as IT becomes an increasingly infrastructural technology (Carr, 2003) and is intimately
intertwined with an organization’s operations, the relationship between IT and risk gets more
complicated. As Clemons (1995) indicated, IT enabled re-engineering changes the risk profiles
of firms undergoing the organizational change. For example, the competency-destroying reengineering initiatives increase political risks. Therefore, IS risk researchers need to look beyond
the functional project level risks and carefully explain how risks emerge and are contained in
larger socio-technical networks where the information systems become embedded.
The current IS risk paradigm of an individual decision maker and the simple causal
model of risk is inadequate for understanding risk control/mitigation in complex socio-technical
systems. Since such systems are characterized by “interactive complexity” and “tight coupling”
(Perrow, 1984), risks increasingly become systemic. We define “systemic risk” as a risk that
originates from multiple sources, affects multiple agents and propagates quickly among
individual parts or components of the network. The probability of breakdowns at the system
level can be caused by the domino effect triggered from a sudden unexpected event (Kaufman
& Scott, 2003). Since the source of a systemic risk cannot be pinpointed and often resides in
the unpredictable interactions among different parts or components, systemic risks cannot be
addressed by controlling or mitigating the top ten risks identified by periodical risk review
meetings based on group consensus (Williams et al., 1997).
Prior Research on High Reliability Organizations (HROs)
A complementary stream of research that focuses on risk control in complex sociotechnical systems are theories of high reliability organizations (HROs) (Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Roberts, 1990; Waller & Roberts, 2003). HRO research has traditionally studied a single
organization operating high-hazard technologies such as a nuclear power plant, nuclear aircraft
carriers, air traffic control and emergency response units. Such organizations are characterized
by complex interactions and tight-coupling, consequently suffering from systemic risks.
However, they are capable of producing “collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality
repeatedly” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) even in fluctuating and unpredictable work conditions
(Weick et al., 1999). Until recently several researchers (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999;
Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Waller & Roberts, 2003) have
pointed out the significance of HROs for main-stream organizations. Weick and et al. (1999)
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calls HROs “harbingers of adaptive organizational forms for an increasingly complex
environment” (p. 82). With IT-enabled global alliances, rapidly decreasing product life cycle
and disruptive innovations, organizations find themselves having to make decisions under
tremendous time pressure and with limited information and any error could cause potentially
disastrous consequences. Therefore, organizations increasingly become “reliability-seeking”:
continuously and effectively staying ahead of competitors and technological obsolescence
through vigilance and intense innovation in an extremely unpredictable and fluctuating
environment (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003).
In order to sustain the complex socio-technical system in face of systemic risks, we posit
that organizations rely upon organizing mechanisms characteristic of HROs. However, few HRO
research to date has provided substantial empirical evidence on how high-reliability principles
could apply to mainstream organizations, except Vogus’ and et al.’s (2003) study of IPO
software companies. Studying radical architectural projects can carry Vogus’ and his
colleagues’ effort further. Less “exotic” and less “far out” (Scott, 1994) than software companies
with a homogenous dot-com culture, they provide us with an interesting case about how
organizations embedded in a tradition-bound industry came together and achieved exceptional
accomplishment by becoming “reliability-seeking” (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003).
Concept of Mindfulness
To sustain a complex socio-technical system in face of emerging systemic risks, Weick
and his colleagues (Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick et al., 1999, p. 105) proposed one critical
HRO cognitive mechanism: “collective mindfulness” -- the heedful interrelations of activities
among social actors -- which, if carefully and richly configured, can “both increase the
comprehension of complexity and loosen tight coupling”. Five collective cognitive processes
contribute to the creation and maintenance of collective mindfulness: preoccupation with failure,
reluctance to simplify interpretations (multiple perspectives), sensitivity to operations (seeing the
big picture of operation in the moment), commitment to resilience (ability to bounce back from
errors and cope with unexpected events via improvisation), and underspecfication of structures
(organized anarchy via fluid decision-making). These processes “create a rich awareness of
discriminatory detail and facilitate the discovery and correction of errors capable of escalation
into catastrophe” (Weick et al., 1999, p. 81).

Systemic
Risk

Risk

Mindfulness
LRO

IT

HRO

IT

Figure1. Research model (LRO: low reliability organization, HRO: high reliability organization)
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However, risk control in HROs is inherently paradoxical: managing interdependence
requires extreme hierarchy while coping with environmental uncertainty requires pushing
decision-making to the lower level (Perrow, 1984; Roberts, 1990). Such inconsistent
requirements consume a good deal of organizational energy and are difficult to achieve. Perrow
(1984) compared this paradox to “Pushmepullyou out of the Doctor Dolittle stories”, a beast
with heads at both ends that wanted to go in both directions at once (p. 331). Employing a “logic
of opposition”(Robey & Boudreau, 1999), we believe that once embedded in the socio-technical
network, information technology can simultaneously contribute to both centralization and
decentralization poles of the HRO paradox. The computing capability of information
technology enables actors to better comprehend complexity, and with its ability to bridge time
and space it also helps in loosening up tight-coupling.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to exam how organizations rely upon organizing
mechanisms of HROs in order to combat emerging systemic risks, and how IT artifacts, in
combination with other social/technical actors, contribute to enabling one critical HRO
mechanism: mindfulness (Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick et al., 1999).

Case Study
Research Setting
We conducted an in-depth case study of the design and construction of the Peter Lewis
Building at Case Western Reserve University developed by Gehry Partners, LLC. For the
purpose of generalization, we are also following several other ongoing Gehry projects: MIT,
Bard and Princeton. Our analysis necessarily refers to some of Gehry’s prior projects. The case
study approach is consistent with our intent to theorize in an area with relatively little prior
research and theory (Benbasat et al. 1987).
The architecture projects by Gehry are perfect natural settings for studying risk control in
complex systems. First, Mr. Frank Gehry is recognized as an especially innovative architect who
has been constantly pushing the envelope in creating new forms of buildings that challenge
conventional wisdom. He embraces risks by experimenting with new materials, information
technology, construction techniques and ways of organizing. At the time of writing, the Lewis
Building is one of the most complex architectural designs in the world. Second, architectural
projects tend to involve multiple actors from different communities, which focuses our attention
upon issues across communities instead of focusing only within a single organization. While
Frank Gehry’s firm is always at the cutting-edge, many of the contractors are from the traditionentrenched construction industry. This gives us a unique case for connecting mainstream
organizations with the “exotic” (Scott, 1994) HROs. Third, Frank Gehry is the first architect to
use Catia, the 3D representation software, not only as a design tool but an organizing tool to
construct buildings. This provides us with an ideal chance to exam the role of information
technology in sustaining a complex network that accomplishes high-risk tasks.
Catia. Instead of traditional 2D drawings, Gehry’s office used Catia, 3D representation software
originally developed in the aerospace industry, to resolve and build the complex surface
geometries. Technical features of Catia include: full visualization; simulation (structural/stress
test); digital pre-assembly (digital integration of components); communication and coordination
(between different actors) (Baba & Nobeoka, 1998) .
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Method
Data collected include interviews, documentations, published reports, visits to
participants’ home offices and onsite observations of the on-going projects. Altogether we
conducted over 50 interviews with the key actors such as architects, general contractor,
contractors, subcontractors, consultants, users, fire inspectors and the local City Planning
Commission. We entered the field with the intention of studying IT-enabled innovations and
risk taking immediately emerged as a predominate theme in our interviews and it was mentioned
virtually by every participant. We asked our participants to contrast and compare how risk and
risk perceptions differed in Gehry’s projects from other conventional architectural projects they
have had in the past few years. We also identified different risk control/mitigation strategies
pursued explicitly or implicitly by actors in the network. Our analysis of the data revealed that
Gehry’s firm and their partners exhibited “collective mindfulness” (Weick & Roberts, 1993;
Weick et al., 1999). Therefore, the five cognitive processes underlying “mindfulness” were
identified independently by the authors. The triangulation among the different readers was
designed to "bring a different and possibly a more objective eye to the evidence" (Eisenhardt,
1989, p.538).

Findings
Our data reveals that in order to successfully control/mitigate risk in complex systems
requires, organizations rely upon organizing mechanisms characteristic of HROs (summarized
in table 1), and IT artifacts such as Catia, in combination with other social/technical actors,
enable the five cognitive processes underlying collective mindfulness (summarized in table 2).
Radical Architectural Projects as High-reliability Organizations (HROs)
Traditional architectural projects are loosely-coupled, low reliability organizations. Their
task requirements are usually standardized buildings of simple shapes and straight lines with
standardized materials. Their operating conditions are stable: historically construction demands
are fairly stable and there are easy substitutions for both the standardized materials and skilled
builders. Architects, clients and contractors conduct business transactions according to
industrial practices, contract and tradition and there is very little need for the actors to meet or
discuss details of the project. Though conventional large-scale projects such as skyscrapers are
complex, they are simple in term of interactive complexity. The risks involved can be easily
addressed by division of labor, professional liabilities, and black-boxed process with little
vertical integration across different phases. As a result, the architects have been more and more
removed from the construction process. It is a common practice that the architect simply throws
the design over the wall and then leaves it up to the subcontractors to develop their own
specifications for actually finishing the building.
“With typical projects, many architects have a standoff position from contractors. They just
basically enforce their documents and their specifications and criticize. And they expect that the
contractor knows how to do everything. They don’t talk about process, they just talk about results.
Architects run around and measure. ….
(Gerhard Mayer, 9/20/02, p.11)
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In fact, the construction industry is considered the most fragmented industry in the world. In the
end, following books and norms, traditional architectural projects can achieve great efficiency
without worrying about reliability: Reliability takes care of itself.
Traditional Architectural Project
(Low reliability Organization)
Simple task
Standardization
Black-box
Stable environment
Efficiency

Gehry’s Project
(High reliability Organization)
Interactive complex task
Non-standardization
Tight-coupling
Dynamic environment
Reliability

Table 1. Traditional project vs. Gehry’s project
By contrast, in Frank Gehry’s projects, reliability can no longer be black-boxed. Instead,
reliability was a mindful achievement of a carefully knitted socio-technical system that exhibits
HRO characteristics. These projects are tightly-coupled in both organization-environment
relations (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003) and within the socio-technical system itself (Perrow,
1984) according to the criteria identified by HRO scholars (Perrow, 1984; Roberts, 1990; Vogus
& Welbourne, 2003): 1) resource dependence (limited substitutions). Due to the complexity of
the building, only a limited pool of subcontractors have the design and fabrication capability
required for the job and a handful of clients with the money and vision to embark on such high
risk projects. 2) time dependent processes. Traditionally, different phases of an architectural
project are largely sequentially interdependent (Thompson, 1967), the next phase using the prior
phase’s outputs as its own inputs. Due to increased complexity of Ghery’s projects, the
interactions among different actors are becoming reciprocally interdependent (Thompson, 1967).
For instance, the architect sought feedbacks on costructability from subcontractors before the
bidding proposal phase. Since the design was kept fluid until the end of the project, carpenters in
the field were participating in completing the design. 3) lack of slack. While all architectural
projects suffer sever penalty if they overrun the budget and schedule, Gehry’s projects suffer
extremely limited resources and shrunk slack after adopting Catia. Lack of in-house talent, they
had to pay top money to get consultants from the aerospace industry. Most of their contractors
could not afford the licensing fee for installing the software. The liability of newness
(Stinchcombe, 1965)!
Gehry’s projects are also interactively complex because it is extremely hard to anticipate
all the ways in which the different technical and social components are going to interact. Unlike
standard building materials, Gehry’s buildings involve a variety of non-traditional construction
materials which increase unanticipated interactions. For instance, the use of titanium on the
Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao was influenced by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union.
Another example concerns the metal ribs on the building: The cold temperature in Cleveland
affected the metal ribs near the roof of the building differently than the ones near the ground. As
a result, the tolerances got twisted and parts didn’t fit. The structural engineering contractor
DeSimone was quick to point out that such failure, if left un-addressed, could also propagate to
adjacent concrete parts, causing systemic damage to the building. Therefore, unlike traditional
projects, Gehry’s projects increasingly suffer from systemic risks.
Replacing traditional 2D drawings with 3D representations created unanticipated
interactions among actors who normally don’t interact. Unable to comprehend the Catia model
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on his own, the Chief Operating Officer of the drywall subcontractor GQ spent 17 weeks in
Ghery’s office working with the Catia expert: during his past 20 years working in the industry,
he had spent less than 8 hours in architects’ offices!
In spite of the increased complexity and tight-coupling, Gehry’s firm has successfully
built daring buildings since they first used Catia to construct the fish sculpture for the 1992
Barcelona Olympics. They have repeatedly transformed traditional architectural projects into
HROs capable of “reliability-seeking” behaviors (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003). The Lewis
Building was completed with all desired functionality only 2 months after the schedule (which is
not bad compared to the 3 year planned duration) and with only a 2% percentage over the
planned budget (which is excellent according to industry standard). This transformation is
enabled by the creative use of IT artifacts, as all the actors we interviewed point out that the
complex forms on their buildings were only buildable with the aid of Catia.
In the following section, we will take a closer look at how Catia, in combination with
other social/technical actors, contributes to the five cognitive processes creating and maintaining
collective mindfulness.
Preoccupation with Failure: Opportunities vs. Threats
In order to achieve mindfulness, actors in HROs have a chronic worry over failures or
potential surprises (Weick et al., 1999): While the crew members of the nuclear submarine were
constantly wary about an encounter with a Russian submarine or a reactor accident (Bierly III &
Spender, 1995), there was widespread recognition at Diablo Canyon that the technology was
capable of surprise (Schulman, 1993). Likewise, everyone we interviewed admitted that they had
apprehensions about the risks of constructing the complex architectural design before and during
the project. All the way through the construction, they were “waiting for the disaster to happen”
(Spark Steel, 4/17/03. p.12).
Prior research indicates that worries about failure can impact actors’ behavior positively
to reduce systemic risks in HROs: bringing more attentiveness to all risk factors, treating near
misses seriously or more likely to report errors (Weick et al., 1999). Our data yields similar
findings. With the sword of Damocles hanging over them, the subcontractors took special
caution in what they did. Their performance became “performativity” (Foucault, 1977), an
awareness of always being under risk, on stage in what they do and how they do it. While the
concrete subcontractor Donely double-checked the information in the Catia extractions before
starting the field installation, and the workers putting up the drywall had to think really “hard”
how to meet the challenge (Ed Sellars, 9/18/02, p.14).
With time, actors were transformed into subjects of a risk identity, who secure their
sense of meaning and reality through their engagement with risk. For instance, since the
design was evolving until the end of the project, carpenters were forced to fill in the details
to complete the design and had to address design issues for combating performance risk.
Gradually, subcontractors found themselves analyzing design a lot more than usual for
even the standard design of structural elements on other jobs by different architects.
However, preoccupation with failure is inherently paradoxical. Consistent with prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the knowledge of the presence of risk alters actors’
behaviors either positively or negatively. Actors with higher aspiration levels may be more
challenged, engaging in creative self-representations in the face of the risk; while others with
lower aspiration levels may be more cautious or feel stressful under risks. Catia helped the
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architect to actively maintain an appropriate level of risk awareness among actors because it
could make risk information more explicit as well as hide risk information.
In the early stage of the project, scary physical models and ugly 3D models were used to
open the eyes of the client and subcontractors to the complexity of the undertaking.
When we show them to a client, they get pretty nervous. They are called Schreck models. It’s a
Yiddish expression, making people nervous.
(Frank Gehry, 6/14/02, p. 3)

While the structural/stress test function of the Catia model showed that the complex geometries
were buildable and injected certain predictability into the construction process, making risk
information explicit could backfire. Therefore, Gehry’s office religiously controlled the access to
the Catia information. While providing 3D savvy Steel fabricator Zahner full Catia models,
Gehry’s office denied the dry wall subcontractor GQ such access during the bidding process,
fearing that the Catia model would induce an exaggerated perception of risk thereby inflating
their bidding price. Other features of Catia that Gehry’s office drew upon include: password
protected FPT site archiving Catia files on the Bard project, the multiple layers and embedded
information in Catia models being selectively reconfigured for intended subcontractors.
Information hiding is a common risk control strategy (Lyytinen, Mathiassen, & Ropponen, 1998)
and IT makes it easy.
Therefore, preoccupation with risk has opposite effects on different actors with different
aspiration levels. Information technology enables actors to have an appropriate level of worry
about risk, because it can manipulate the amount of risk information to be communicated.
Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations: Diversity vs. Common Understanding
HROs are reluctant to simplify interpretations of the current situation by actively seeking
out divergent worldviews or perspectives among members of organization (Weick et al., 1999).
Instead, the reality in HROs is negotiated complexity where a “wide range of informal interorganizational agreements” are constantly negotiated and renewed (Schulman, 1993, p. 362).
Unlike traditional projects where the architect almost has no direct contact with
subcontractors, Gehry Partners seek expert opinions from subcontractors through the innovative
“design-assist”, where subcontractors are invited to comment early on about the design in an
engineering capacity before the bid is awarded (Tombesi, 2002). Getting people who are
ultimately responsible for building the design involved early on helps the architect/engineer to
leverage specialty-contractor knowledge including: 1) subcontractors’ intimate knowledge about
space needs during construction (e.g. access path for bringing equipment and materials, routing
clearances for workers moving around)(Gil, Tommelein, Kirkendall, & Ballard, 2001), 2)
knowledge gained from “cross-fertilization”, where subcontractors piggyback on prior
experiences with other projects by different owners and different design firms (Gil et al., 2001).
Pushing the engineering decisions earlier into the design phase was critical for the Lewis
Building, because its complex geometries made constructability and economic risks more
systemic than traditional buildings. A dramatic example of this comes from A. Zahner
Company, the sheet metal fabricator. Early on Gehry’s office designed the metal curtain wall for
the exterior of the Lewis Building and the Catia model indicated that this could be built with
simple metal studs in the field. During the design assist, based on their experience on a prior
Gehry project and the parametric information in the Catia model, Zahner counter-proposed a
more cost-efficient prefabricated shingle configuration. This also led to another innovative idea:
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using metal for the deck on top of the structural steel on the building, which was not only less
expensive but also subsequently mitigated the fire risk associated with the original wood design.
Moreover, Catia helps actors in avoiding over-simplified interpretations in at least two
ways. Firstly, its capability to run millions of simulations or structural/stress tests within seconds,
thus providing an alternative perspective that a human mind may be incapable of reaching. The
concrete subcontractor Donley described how flabbergasted the general contractor was when the
Catia model indicated a collision of the concrete with the drywall.
When they pulled it [the Catia model] up and turned on the drywall layer and the concrete layer,
instead of just the drywall layer, the two ran into each other. So it was something that they never
saw [italics added] because they never had those two layers turned on…”
(Donley, 3/20/03, p.18)

Secondly, while the ability of Catia to interface with a constellation of different software
accommodates actors skilled in the different phases of computing, its ability to generate 2D
drawings compensated for actors with poor 3D visions, an innate character. In the steel
subcontractor Mariani’s words, “you either have it [3D vision] or you don’t have it’ (p.9). As a
result, a greater degree of requisite variety in interpretations was promoted.
Paradoxically, the greater variety of inputs also incurs the cost of a lack of consensus and
increased conflicts. HROs researchers recommend that organizations institutionalize
disagreement management and cultivate credibility and deference (Bierly III & Spender, 1995;
Weick & Roberts, 1993). On Gehry’s projects, communications protocol was clearly defined in
the contract. Whenever there was a problem or question in the field, the workers would refer to
the latest version of the Catia model as “the arbitrator” (Donley, 3/20/03, p.8). To avoid the
discrepancy between the Catia model and Frank Gehry’s gestural model which captured the
architect’s original intents, Gehry stuck to a “no computer” policy.
Yeah, and Frank always says, he hates to look at the computer because he says it sucks the life out
of the form and the computer image, for one thing, is a 2D image. The visualization is very poor,
there’s no light, there’s no life to it, it’s dead, it’s just dead and it’s really, and so Frank, yeah, you
have to drag him to the computer to get him to look at it. He hates it.
(Craig Webb, 1/8/03, p.8)

Whenever the original intents were concerned, physical models made by human hands took
precedence over digital models. Like other HROs, trust is maintained to counter-balance the
redundancy that takes the form of diversity and skepticism (Weick et al., 1999).
Therefore, the unwillingness to simplify interpretations increases requisite variety.
However such“ divergence in analytical perspectives (Schulman, 1993) may lead to a lack of
common understanding. Information technology, in combination with other organization
innovations such as design-assist and communication protocols, helps to reconcile this paradox
by promoting both diversity and consensus.
Sensitivity to Operations: Parts vs. Whole
Sensitivity to operations refers to the collective cognitive process where actors
comprehend the meaning of the moment while maintaining an integrated big picture of the
overall situation (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Weick et al., 1999). The requirement of
maintaining such “situational awareness” (Endsley, 1997, p. 97) could be paradoxical due to
human being’s bounded rationality. While human actors tend to focus on parts of the system and
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not realize that an improvement on one section of the system may be detrimental to the whole
system (Churchman, 1968), an attention to the whole makes it difficult to zoom in on the finer
details of the sub-systems.
With its central database and a information threading Website, Catia allowed measuring
and tracking each components of the building. The “fine-grain information” is a effective means
of risk mitigation (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999) by introducing certainty and trust into the
environment. Actors were able to make a contract on what they could see and what could be
measured (Jim Glymph, 11/9/02, p.8).
“… Catia is just marvelous. Because when you do a quantity contract, you can track quantities
precisely and you can treat everybody fairly. Now if you find you had to add three more pieces,
you have absolute precision about what you added, how much, what his unit prices are, this is how
much he gets paid. …This is basically a quantity survey system.”
(Jim Glymph, 11/9/02, p.8)

However, Catia also attends to the other horn of the paradox by showing how elements at one
local location have “significant time-space distanciated effects” elsewhere (Law & Urry, 2003)
and how they impact the system as a whole. Since all representations of each component of the
building are integrated in the Catia model, every change in one section or component can be used
to propagate all necessary changes to related sections of the building plans (Greco, 2001). For
instance, whenever a change was made to the physical model of the Lewis building, Gehry’s
office would digitalized it and fed it back into the 3D Catia model. Then a series of algorithmbased structural/stress tests were ran to see how the changed parts interact with other sectors of
the building. “Sweeping”(Churchman, 1968) many possible interactions among different parts
of the system into the model, Catia helped local actors to make decisions which were more
rational on the whole system level.
Another excellent example of how Catia has enhanced actors’ sensitivity to operation is
the way it generates 3D <xyz> coordinates for the building. In traditional buildings with the
prevalence of rectangular shapes, the architect only generates highly symbolic 2D drawings with
limited details. During the construction phase, each subcontractor will identify a few reference
points on-site which are based upon the 2D drawings and start to locate walls, plumbing and so
on from these known points. Each measurement is taken off of the last measurement within the
local 2D plane. By contrast, in Catia, the measurement process is shifted from a 2D grid method
to a 3D <xyz> coordinate system. Each measurement is located against a single starting point
(x=0, y=0, z=0) pre-established before the construction starts. Guided by Catia-generated
coordinates, surveyors on the Lewis Building used laser sights, fixed points on the ground and
reflective prisms mounted on nearby building to precisely locate every elements of the building
in three-dimensional space. Unlike the traditional 2D grid method using the local information in
a given 2D plane, each coordinate in the 3D system contains the spatial information relative to
the context of the whole building. Therefore, in laying the curvy brick wall on the Lewis
Building in reference to the control points, a carpenter was making sure that each brick he laid
was at the precise location both relative to his immediate environment and relative to the
building as a whole. He was attending to the local and the global simultaneously, without really
thinking about the global.
Therefore, maintaining a sensitivity to operations requires actors to attend both to the
meaning of the moment and the big picture of the whole system. Information technology attends
to both horns of the paradox by providing fine-grain details embedded in the global information.
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Commitment to Resilience/Underspecification of Structures: Centralization vs.
decentralization
Commitment to resilience refers to the ability to bounce back from errors and cope with
“surprises in the moment” after dangers have become manifest via “constrained improvisation” 1
(Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Weick et al., 1999). Underspecfication of structures refers to
“organized anarchy” where fluid decision making is made possible (Weick et al., 1999). We
discuss the last two cognitive processes together because they are closely intertwined, as
improvisations are often enabled by decoupling decision making from hierarchy and pushing
decision-making to actors with expertise and experience. Moreover, since improvisations in
HROs are “constrained” and anarchy is “organized”, both processes require a dialectical balance
between centralization and decentralization.
On Gehry’s projects, actors in the field were encouraged to come up with innovative
ways of building with the aid of information technology. The foreman of the drywall contractor
found himself for the first time in his career needing a laptop for checking 2D AutoCad drawings
on the site. Simple new tools were invented: a laser clam and other “simple hand tools” to
provide more accuracy, and tube scaffolding to access hard-to-get-to areas (Ed Seller, 11/11/02,
p.15). The concrete subcontractor Donley commented on their strategy to pour the 80 feet high
leaning columns in the air, which were so tricky to put up that they would fall over causing
systemic risks: One hundred seventy five veteran carpenters had to be assigned to do the work.
I don’t think Donley’s ever put a project engineer on site with 3D AutoCad and [for] every column
that they to pour, they need to plot, you know, in a computer and then slice it at different elevation
and then talk back and forth with the engineers, you know, almost once or twice an hour
depending on where they were on the job and get them information. You’re constantly radioing
information back and forth.
(Donley, 3/20/03, p. 15)

As the ad hoc group was established outside the traditional operational boundaries to provide
expert problem solving, the emerging crisis was contained. Note the simulation and analytical
capability found in Catia and 3D AutoCad was also enrolled into such informal “epistemic
networks”(Rochlin, 1993) to help better diagnose problems.
At the same time, information technology such as Catia helped in balancing the
decentralization in the field with centralized control. The architect designated the Catia wire
diagram as the controlling document defining where the controlling structural lines were and
how shapes interacted with each other. The parametric model extended the architect’s control
throughout the whole process of construction by bringing all the pieces together and tied the
actors back to the architect. The parametric information embedded in the Catia model were fed
into the fabricators’ CNC machines, ensuring that the plywood panels were laser-cut to reflect
the exact shapes developed by the hands of the architect. In case of a dispute on the construction
site, the two Catia stations were “the arbitrator” (Donley, 3/20/03, p.8). Furthermore, the control
of the wire-frame model was clearly defined in the contract: while any change orders should go
through the general contractor but copy Gehry’s office, Gehry’s office had to approve any
change made to the Catia wire-frame model.
1

Weick et al. (1999) identifies three ways to establish “commitment to resilience”: improvisation, informal
“epistemic networks”, and ambivalence towards the applicability of past experience. We believe that ability to create
informal “epistemic networks” is a form of improvisation, and a suspicion of past experience falls under the 2nd
cognitive process: “reluctance to simplify interpretations”.
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Mindfulness
Preoccupation with
failure
Reluctance to
simplify
interpretations

Sensitivity to
operations
Commitment to
resilience
Underspecfication
of structures

Paradoxes
Opportunity
vs.
threat
Diversity
vs.
Common
Understanding

Org. Mechanisms

Design-assist;
Gehry sign-off;

Parts vs. Whole
Centralization
vs.
Decentralization

Contract;
Comm. Protocol;
General surveyor;

Catia Attributes
Structural/stress test;
Password;
Layers;
Embedded information;
Simulations;
Layers;
Visualization;
2D extracts;
Central database;
Simulations;

Comments
Make risk vivid;
Hide information;
Different actors / visual
styles;
Alternative perspective;

Simulations

Global vs. local information;
Make explicit interactions
among different parts;
Correct errors on the fly

Wire-frame model;
xyz measurements;

Control key points while
leaving others open

Table 2. IT artifacts contributing to creating and maintaining the five cognitive processes
underlying “mindfulness”
Therefore, both commitment to resilience and underspecification of structures require
simultaneously centralization and decentralization. Information technology, in combination with
other organizing mechanisms such as contract, communication protocols and role definitions,
attends to the two horns of the paradox by empowering local actors to improvise in face of
emerging risks and maintaining certain strategic structures and processes.

Discussion and Conclusion
The findings of this study suggest organizations rely upon HRO organizing mechanisms
to control/mitigate risk in complex socio-technical systems. IT artifacts, in combination with
other socio-technical actors, such as competent workers, contract and communication protocol,
enable such mechanisms as collective mindfulness.
This study has two major limitations. First, this study inherits the methodological
limitations of a case study design. Second, the retrospective nature of interviews could suffer
from faulty memory and tendency of self-representation. Future research could employ multiple
sites to improve the generalizability and a longitudinal design to exam how the five processes of
mindfulness changes and dynamically play off with each other over time. Nevertheless, this
study contributes to existing literature on HROs and software risk management in several ways.
Theories of High Reliability Organizations (HROs)
This study complements the prior literature on high reliability organizations (Bigley &
Roberts, 2001; Roberts, 1990; Waller & Roberts, 2003) in several ways. First, even though
information technology has become a pervasive aspect of organizations, current HRO research
doesn’t address the issue of IT artifacts except a few fleeting mentions (e,g, Grabowski &
Roberts (1999). This study opens the black-box of IT artifacts and looks at the paradoxical role
of IT in risk control/mitigation in complex systems. Second, if they do mention information
technology (e.g. Weick et al. (1999)), HRO research tends to focus on how information
technology increases complexity and tight-coupling of complex systems. This study also looks at
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how IT artifacts enables HRO organizing mechanisms, especially mindfulness. Third, while
HRO research mostly focuses on a single organization, this study provides an interesting case in
an inter-organizational setting. It gives organizational culture, one of the most promising HRO
principles (Weick, 1987), a different meaning: it may be inefficient when actors come from
heterogeneous backgrounds. Our case study suggests an alternative source of high reliability: the
tactful use of IT artifacts. Fourth, consistent with the recent development in HRO research
(Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; Waller & Roberts, 2003) arguing for a need to relate HROs to
main-stream organizations, our case provides an example of how organizations in a traditionbound industry achieve exceptional accomplishment by becoming “reliability-seeking”(Vogus &
Welbourne, 2003).
Theories of Software Risk Management
Our study also has several implications for large-scale software development. First,
going beyond the predominant quantitative, simple casual model of software risk management,
this study provides a qualitative description of how systemic risks are controlled/mitigated in
complex systems. Second, our study echoes prior research (Moynihan, 1997) in that a single,
all-encompassing risk taxonomy for all software projects is neither realistic nor practical. Each
complex system has its own unique risks and emergent systemic risks are impossible to pinpoint.
Risk management is about “attention shaping and intervention”(Lyytinen et al., 1998), and actors
must tactically create and maintain mindfulness. Third, current software risk research doesn’t
pay much attention to the role of information technology itself in managing the development
process 2 . Our study suggests that strategic use of IT artifacts (e.g. centralized database, digital
contract) is important in controlling/mitigating risk. Finally, this study contributes to the current
debate over the strategic importance of information technology. Contrary to the commodity view
(Carr, 2003) , a tactical deployment of information technology encourages risk-taking and
contributes to a firm’s competitive advantages: IT does matter and has a strong impact for
achieving positive results.
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